required when considering this type of asylum application, 7 especially if the alien was compelled to return to his country of origin. 8 This Article examines how courts have analyzed an asylum applicant's voluntary return to his country of origin. Part I explains the standards for I-589 relief from removal in the forms of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Part I also analyzes the adjudication of these claims in immigration courts, including an alien's burden of proof for I-589 relief and the evaluation of an alien's credibility under the REAL ID Act of 2005. Part II addresses the lack of consistency among administrative immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the federal circuit courts of appeals when considering the effect of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin on his application for I-589 relief. Finally, Part III concludes that, although a voluntary return is properly considered in determining whether an alien has met his burden of proof, such trips should not be used to render an adverse credibility determination.
I. THE EVALUATION AND ADJUDICATION OF I-589 APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF
FROM REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES Asylum law is relatively new in international jurisprudence. The United Nations (U.N.) formulated the concept of asylum, and member states later adopted it in reaction to the horrors that were uncovered in the aftermath of World War II. 9 In essence, the U.N. sought to create a system wherein refugees could seek protection from persecution in their country of origin based on immutable characteristics by traveling to a foreign country. 10 The also infra note 81 (listing additional cases in which courts have denied applications for relief based on voluntary return trips to the alien's country of origin). 7. See infra notes 82-109 (providing examples of courts holding that an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin is not dispositive in adjudicating an I-589 claim for relief). United States did not adopt such a comprehensive scheme until 1968, 11 and it did not pass its own Refugee Act until 1980. 12 In the United States, asylum law is distinct from refugee law. 13 A "refugee" seeks admission and protection before he enters the United States, pursuant to section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
14 By contrast, an , available at http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/Helpingrefugees_000.pdf (noting that international law defines "asylee" seeks admission and protection after he has fled his country of origin and already entered the United States, pursuant to section 208 of the INA. 15 
A. Standards for Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Protection Under the
Convention Against Torture
Relief Through Asylum
Asylum is a discretionary form of relief, 16 and the alien has the burden of establishing that he is entitled to such relief. 17 To establish eligibility for asylum, an alien must show that he has either suffered past persecution or has "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" in his country of origin or last habitual residence. 18 Although past persecution may be sufficient to establish eligibility for asylum, the INA requires immigration judges to exercise discretion and deny asylum in certain situations.
19 Asylum may be 19. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (explaining that "[a]n applicant who has been found to have established such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim," but that the presumption is rebuttable). An alien is ineligible for asylum if he "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of others." INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (providing examples of individuals who do not qualify as refugees). Aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes are also ineligible for asylum. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) (considering aliens "convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime . . . a danger to the community in the United States"); see also denied following "a fundamental change in circumstances such that the [alien] no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution." 20 The alien may rebut this determination by demonstrating "compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution," or by establishing "a reasonable possibility" of "other serious harm." 21 To establish asylum eligibility based on the possibility of future persecution, an alien must show both a subjective fear of persecution and that his fear is "objectively reasonable." 22 A fear is objectively reasonable if there is a "discernable chance of persecution," no matter how slight. 23 An alien must file an asylum claim within one year after arriving in the United States, unless he provides evidence of either "changed circumstances which materially affect [his] eligibility for asylum [,] 
Relief Through Withholding of Removal
Withholding of removal is a form of relief that prevents the removal of an alien to a country that poses a significant risk of persecution. 25 Withholding of removal requires the alien to show a likelihood that his "life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal" because of his "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 26 A past threat to life or freedom creates a presumption of a future threat, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a fundamental change in circumstances. 27 Although a request to withhold removal need not be filed within one year of arrival in the United States, 28 withholding of removal does not provide a basis to become a lawful permanent resident. The consequences for being granted withholding of removal rather than asylum are substantial, as an alien who is granted withholding of removal does not become a legal permanent resident, the alien may not file a visa petition for his family members to immigrate to the United States, and withholding of removal does not
Relief Under the Convention Against Torture
Withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT are also forms of relief that depend on a likelihood of harm in an alien's country of origin. 30 However, rather than requiring persecution based on certain characteristics, as is required for asylum and withholding of removal, CAT relief requires the alien to show that he would "more likely than not be tortured" if forced to return to his country of origin.
31
Under the CAT, removal can be either withheld or deferred. 32 The difference between the two forms of relief is in the protections afforded and the classes of aliens barred from relief. 33 Withholding under the CAT has discretionary eligibility requirements, 34 but deferral under the CAT is mandatory and available to anyone who meets the standard. 
B. Standards for Credibility and Burden of Proof Under the REAL ID Act in Immigration Courts
There are two main assessments that an immigration judge must render in adjudicating an asylum application. First, the immigration judge must determine whether the alien is credible. 36 Second, the immigration judge must determine whether the alien met his burden of proof. 37
Evaluating the Asylum Applicant's Credibility
An immigration judge's evaluation of an alien's credibility is "arguably the most crucial aspect of any asylum case," and is considered to be the most significant obstacle an asylum applicant must overcome. 38 For applications filed after May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act applies. The REAL ID Act delineates a totality of the circumstances test that directs the judge to consider "all relevant factors. (2006)). Evaluation of the credibility of an applicant who filed for relief before the passing of the REAL ID Act must be based on "specific,
[T]he demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim. 40 Although an immigration judge can rely on any inaccuracy or inconsistency in evaluating credibility, any adverse determination must be supported by the record. 41 Generally, testimony is considered incredible if it is inconsistent or improbable, or the applicant's account conflicts with the current conditions in the country. 42 One of an immigration judge's most difficult tasks in assessing credibility is determining the reliability of the evidence documenting country conditions. 43 cogent reasons" that "bear a legitimate nexus to the" evaluation and go to the heart of the claim. 
Assessing Whether the Asylum Applicant Has Satisfied His Burden of Proof
Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, in part, to create uniformity in the adjudication of asylum applications. 44 In order to sustain his burden under the REAL ID Act, an alien applying for asylum:
[M]ust comply with the applicable requirements to submit information or documentation in support of the applicant's application for relief or protection as provided by law or by regulation or in the instructions for the application form. In evaluating the testimony of the applicant or other witness in support of the application, the immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant's burden of proof. In determining whether the applicant has met such burden, the immigration judge shall weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record. Where the immigration judge determines that the applicant should provide evidence which corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant demonstrates that the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.
45
From the alien's perspective, satisfying his burden of proof is one of the most difficult tasks in filing an asylum application. 47. Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the standard for admissibility is instead "whether the evidence is probative and whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law" (quoting Bustos-Torres v. I.N.S., 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
Department of Justice recognize the unique challenges of providing evidence of persecution and country conditions, 48 and consequently have attempted to create a system that ensures due process. 49 In removal proceedings, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) establishes removability, the alien seeking relief has the burden of establishing that he is eligible for relief and that relief should be granted in the court's discretion. 50 If the alien's application is subject to mandatory denial, "the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds [for denial] do not apply." 51 In assessing an alien's application for relief, the judge may require the alien to provide evidence corroborating his claim. 52 The INA provides that "[t]he testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant's burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee." 53 If the judge determines that the applicant failed to meet his burden, the judge may require corroborative evidence, which the alien must provide unless he "does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence." 49. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1997) (allowing the immigration judge to consider "any prior written statement, made by a respondent or by any other person, that is material and relevant to the issues in the case"); see also Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 992-93 (adjusting the standard of admissibility in recognition of the difficulties faced by asylum applicants); Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 380 (BIA 1986) (explaining that "documentary evidence in deportation proceedings need not comport with the strict judicial rules of evidence; rather, in order to be admissible, such evidence need only be probative and its use fundamentally fair, so as not to deprive an alien of due process of law").
50. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the applicant to prove that he filed his application in a timely manner); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (requiring the applicant to prove that he is eligible for relief). There is no discretionary element for deferral of removal under the CAT. Failure to provide corroborating evidence may have a negative impact on the judge's credibility determination, despite the distinction between credibility and burden of proof in the statute. This is because "the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question." 55 Under these guidelines, the judge must determine whether the alien has proven that he is eligible for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. 56 Although there is no established definition of the term "preponderance of the evidence," the BIA has explained that "it is sufficient that the proof only establish that [the applicant's claim] is probably true." 57 Thus, for an alien to prevail on an asylum claim, he must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, based on his own credible testimony, the credible testimony of any witnesses, and any reasonably available corroborative evidence, that he has a subjective fear of future persecution in his country of origin and that his fear is objectively reasonable. 58 The alien must 2000) ("While consistent, detailed, and credible testimony may be sufficient to carry the alien's burden, evidence corroborating his story, or an explanation for its absence, may be required where it would reasonably be expected."). The applicant may present "both evidence of general country conditions and evidence that substantiates the applicant's particular claims." Id. at 288. Additionally, the judge may require evidence of the applicant's personal plight, but only in circumstances where this evidence is reasonable. Id. This evidence is necessary only "if it is of the type that would normally be created or available in the particular country and is accessible to the alien, such as through friends, relatives, or co-workers." Id. 1987) . An alien may also be granted asylum based on past persecution alone. Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that "applicants who have suffered forced or involuntary sterilization necessarily have an inherent well-founded fear of future persecution because such persons will be persecuted for the remainder of their lives"). Although an applicant who successfully established past persecution will generally be presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution, that presumption can be rebutted if the DHS proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, a fundamental change in circumstances: either that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution, or that the applicant could reasonably avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the alien's country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208. 312, 313-14 (BIA 1998) (holding that the presumption of future persecution is unavailable when circumstances in the applicant's country of origin have changed). Internal relocation is presumed to be unreasonable "unless the Government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii). Additionally, the presumption of future persecution is unavailable "if the applicant's fear of future persecution is unrelated to the past persecution." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If the DHS rebuts the presumption of future persecution, the applicant must either provide compelling reasons for his inability to return to his country of origin, or establish also establish that any mandatory denial ground for asylum does not apply. 59 For an alien to prevail on a withholding of removal claim, he must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence and through credible testimony and corroborating evidence, that his life or freedom would more likely than not be threatened in his country of origin. 60 The alien must also establish that a mandatory denial ground for withholding of removal does not apply. 61 Finally, an alien seeking relief under the CAT must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence and through credible testimony and corroborating evidence, that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to his country of origin.
II. IMMIGRATION JUDGES INCONSISTENTLY ANALYZE VOLUNTARY RETURN TRIPS IN EVALUATING I-589 APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM REMOVAL
In adjudicating asylum applications, immigration judges most often render their decisions orally. 63 In their decisions, immigration judges are required to that there is a reasonable possibility that he may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). 59. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2)(ii) (explaining that it is the applicant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that that the ground for denial does not apply). For example, once the government presents evidence of the possibility of permanent resettlement in another country, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the nature of his stay and ties were too tenuous, or the conditions of his residence too restricted, for him to be "firmly resettled. incoherent," and questioning whether the deficiencies in the opinion were caused by "antiquated recording equipment, an exceptionally heavy caseload, or some other reason"); Chhay v. make factual findings, explain the relevant legal standards, assess credibility, evaluate questions of law, and render discretionary determinations. 64 Successful application of the law and delineation of these various steps can be especially difficult in oral rulings, as immigration judges render decisions under severe time constraints. 65 Delivering decisions orally, although timely, can lead to confusing factual and legal assessments. It is often unclear whether an immigration judge's specific finding was based on removability, credibility, eligibility for relief, burden of proof, mandatory denial, or discretionary grounds. 66 Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (advising immigration judges "to use more straightforward language").
Professor First, it is more difficult to reach a hasty conclusion when one has to articulate convincing reasons in writing. Hopefully the difficulties in explaining the decision will sometimes cause an adjudicator to reconsider. Second, the adjudicator who knows he or she will have to justify the decision in writing has greater incentive to consider the case carefully before reaching a decision. Third, without reasons, the losing party will often find the result even more difficult to swallow. Fourth, a written record of reasons assures the public that the process is serious and careful. And fifth, reasons will be necessary if, as recommended below, the decision is subjected to possible review. 66. See Rempell, supra note 65 (noting the difficulties appellate courts face in attempting to decipher and interpret oral opinions by immigration judges).
The Second Circuit's order in Tek Lie Kwee v. I.N.S., 156 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2005), demonstrates the difficulty in reviewing an immigration judge's oral decision where there are intersections of law and unclear findings regarding credibility, corroboration, and burden of proof. In this case, the Second Circuit remanded proceedings to the BIA based on the insufficient and confusing findings made by the immigration judge. Id. at 373-74. The court explained that the immigration judge "made numerous remarks about whether the evidence presented by Kwee was credible or worthy of belief," but that the judge "never made an explicit credibility finding,"
These types of inconsistent and imprecise findings have been particularly true for analyses regarding an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin.
67 Immigration judges, the BIA, and courts of appeals have treated voluntary returns to an alien's country of origin differently in adjudicating claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. This lack of consistency endangers the lives of true asylees, undermines the integrity of the asylum application process, and reduces confidence in the courts' ability to ensure due process.
68

A. Analyzing an Alien's Voluntary Return Trip in the Burden of Proof Context
It is legally sound for an immigration judge to find that an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin undermines his fear of future persecution, especially in cases in which the alien did not suffer past persecution. Indeed, in Restrepo v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the immigration judge's determination that the applicant failed to demonstrate that he had an objectively reasonable fear of returning to Colombia, in part, which is required by Second Circuit precedent. Id. The court disagreed with the immigration judge's criticism of the quality and sufficiency of Kwee's evidence, concluding that Kwee's testimony "presented enough evidence to support his asylum and withholding of removal claims." Id. (noting that the immigration judge "found that Kwee offered no evidence to prove" his religious or ethnic background, that Kwee "failed to draw a connection between his persecution and racial unrest in Indonesia," his country of origin, and that "Kwee's asylum claim was dubious because he had left Indonesia and voluntarily returned several times"). However, because the immigration judge made no explicit ruling on Kwee's credibility, the court remanded the case. Id. at 374.
The Fourth Circuit has also struggled to review decisions that do not provide explicit evaluations of an applicant's credibility. For example, in Tchaya v. Ashcroft, 106 F. App'x 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2004), the applicant claimed that she was arrested and beaten twice on account of her political opinion, but voluntarily returned to Cameroon, her country of origin, twice before seeking asylum. Without explicitly delineating the grounds, the immigration judge denied Tchaya's application. Id. at 179. Although the immigration judge failed to make an explicit adverse credibility determination, the Fourth Circuit found that it was "clear that the immigration judge implicitly found Tchaya's testimony to lack credibility" and "questioned the claimed severity of her mistreatment in jail in light of the fact that Tchaya vacationed in the United States and voluntarily returned to Cameroon without seeking asylum three separate times after her first two arrests." Id. at 179-80. Relying on its interpretation of the immigration judge's holding, the court ultimately denied Tchaya's application for asylum, finding that "substantial evidence support[ed] the immigration judge's" conclusion. Id. at 180.
Additional complications can arise when the BIA alters the immigration judge's decision, declines to review portions of the immigration judge's decision, or completes its own review de novo. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the BIA "committed legal error by making its own factual determination and engaging in a de novo review of the [immigration judge's] factual findings" rather than applying a clearly erroneous standard); Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1997) (criticizing a decision by the BIA for its disorganization and lack of clarity).
67. 73 However, Restrepo did not apply for asylum while in the United States, and he voluntarily returned to Colombia later that year. 74 When he returned, the FARC continued to threaten him and, after six months, he returned to the United States and applied for asylum. 75 Restrepo appeared before an immigration judge who found that he failed to demonstrate that he suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
76
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit explained that, although Restrepo was harassed by the FARC, he did not suffer past persecution because neither he nor his family members were ever physically harmed.
77 Accordingly, the court concluded that Restrepo was not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 78 In denying Restrepo's petition for relief, the court explained that "[w]hile [his] subjective fear of persecution may be genuine, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that it is not objectively reasonable," due, in part, to Restrepo's subsequent return to Colombia. 79 (affirming the BIA's denial of an asylum application because the applicant "failed to show his fear of future persecution was objectively reasonable: he voluntarily returned to El Salvador after allegedly leaving to escape persecution, and was able to obtain a passport and visa; he presented no evidence that his family remaining in El Salvador has been harmed since he left"); Sarhangzadeh v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 1163, No. 95-70026, 1996 WL 266496, at *3 (9th Cir. May 17, 1996) (holding that "the fact that Sarhangzadeh left Iran in 1985, visited the United States, and voluntarily returned to Iran for three more years before seeking asylum strongly supports the BIA's decision" denying the alien's asylum application).
analyzed individually to discourage the "rubber stamping" of cases in which an alien has returned to his country of origin.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered its analysis of return trips in De Santamaria v. U.S. Attorney General, holding that a Colombian alien's voluntary return to Colombia in the wake of FARC harassment did not negate her well-founded fear of future persecution. 82 The court clarified that merely because Santamaria had voluntarily returned to Colombia was insufficient to overcome her credible testimony that she subjectively feared future persecution. 83 The court distinguished its ruling from that in Restrepo because of the unique facts of Santamaria's case.
Santamaria became a "political target" of the FARC because of her involvement in democratic and social justice organizations, as well as her support for the anti-FARC mayor of Mosque, Colombia.
84
The FARC threatened Santamaria's life because of her political involvement. 85 In November of 1998, FARC "rebels" assaulted her, overtook her car, pulled her out of the vehicle by her hair, and threw her to the ground. 86 The rebels warned her that she was an "enemy of the people" and threatened her life. 87 Consequently, Santamaria traveled to the United States to evade the FARC.
88
Despite visiting the United States three times to escape the FARC, Santamaria did not seek asylum, and she eventually returned to Colombia to continue her work. 89 Following additional threats to her life, the torture and murder of her family's groundskeeper, and a beating, Santamaria again traveled to the United 84. Id. at 1003 (noting that Santamaria was a member of the Colombian Liberal Party and "various other political and social groups," had been married to the Colombian ambassador to Peru, was a member of the New Democratic Force, which promoted democratic government in Colombia, founded the "Help With Love" organization, which provided assistance to the poor, and spoke to teenagers to discourage them from joining the FARC).
85. Id. The FARC threatened Santamaria "by mail and telephone, warning her that [they] would retaliate if she did not end her political activities." Id.
86. Id. at 1003-04. The rebels threw Santamaria to the ground face-first and stepped on her back. Id.
87. Id. at 1003 (explaining that the man leading the assault identified himself as a commander of a division of the FARC and specifically referenced Santamaria's work with the Colombian government). Following this incident, Santamaria moved to a different apartment and had a bullet-proof door installed; changed her speaking schedule; and used different transportation so that she would not be identified. Id. Despite her efforts, the FARC continued to threaten Santamaria by phone and graffiti messages; on one occasion, FARC rebels painted "Death to Help With Love" on her parents' home. Id. States. 90 She returned to Colombia once more, but after the FARC again threatened her life, she applied for asylum in the United States.
91
The immigration judge denied Santamaria's asylum application, reasoning that her voluntary returns to Colombia "significantly negate [d] any subjective fear of persecution if she were to return at this time." 92 The Eleventh Circuit overturned the immigration judge's decision, explaining that "most of Santamaria's travels to the United States occurred before the most severely persecutory acts occurred." 93 The court noted that Santamaria returned to Colombia only once after the most severe persecution took place. 94 The court explained that " [v] oluntary returns to a home country may weaken or undermine an applicant's claim of persecution," but emphasized that an applicant's voluntary return is not dispositive. 95 The court applied a totality of the circumstances test, considering "the reasons for the asylum applicant's return, whether the return was without incident, and whether the applicant's family members continue to live in the home country without incident." 96 In considering the circumstances in Santamaria's case, the court concluded that her return to Colombia did not prevent her from establishing a subjective fear of harm, or that her fear was objectively reasonable.
97
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a nuanced approach in evaluating the effect of an alien's return to his country of origin on his I-589 application for relief from removal. 98 The Ninth Circuit requires immigration judges to consider both the context and the "voluntariness" of an alien's return to his country of origin. For example, in Smolniakova v. Gonzales, the appeals court reversed an immigration judge's determination that the alien would not reasonably face future persecution in Russia. 100 The court held that Smolinakova's return to Russia did not preclude relief because she returned to tend to her dying mother. 101 Similarly, in Yan v. Holder, the court held that the immigration judge erred in finding that Yan did not have a well-founded fear of persecution because the court failed to consider that Yan had "returned [to China] in order to tie up personal and financial matters," and that he "was under police surveillance" for the duration of the trip.
102
The Ninth Circuit has reached similar conclusions in analyzing the effect of voluntary returns in past persecution cases. In Pena-Torres v. Gonzales, Pena-Torres, a native citizen of Mexico, testified that Mexican police violently beat him because of his homosexuality.
103
He explained that the police "indicated a continuing interest in him by threatening that they knew where he lived and would harm his family should he report them." 104 The immigration judge determined that, even if Pena-Torres demonstrated that he suffered past persecution, his return to Mexico rebutted any presumption of future persecution.
105
The appellate court disagreed, holding that an applicant's voluntary return to his country of origin is only one factor to consider in rebutting the presumption of future persecution. 101. Id. at 1050 (finding that it was reasonable for Smolinakova to return to take care of both her mother and her family); accord Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the applicant's return to his home country of Lebanon to visit his dying parents was not "substantial evidence that his fear of persecution was not well-founded").
102. 330 F. App'x 684, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the importance of the fact that Yan did not suffer persecution during his return to China).
103. 128 F. App'x 628, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the officers accosted Pena-Torres after he left a "gay bar").
104. Id. 105. Id. at 632. 106. Id. (cautioning that "return trips are a factor" in rebutting the presumption of future persecution, but that an applicant's voluntary return alone is insufficient to do so).
107. Id. at 633 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the immigration judge erred in failing to properly consider the alien's explanation for his return trip, which was to gather enough funds to flee permanently because of continuing persecution of homosexuals in Mexico, and noting that return trips alone cannot rebut presumption of past persecution).
Derevianko v. Reno, the Third Circuit found that the immigration judge's denial of the alien's asylum application was particularly unreasonable because the judge failed to consider the circumstances of the alien's return trips and noted that reports from the State Department and Amnesty International described substantial violence in his country of origin. 108 Similarly, in Cooke v. Mukasey, the Eighth Circuit held that a Liberian's failure to seek asylum during a previous trip to the United States did not undermine his claim for relief because he returned to Liberia to help his three minor children escape.
109
B. Analyzing an Alien's Voluntary Return Trip in the Credibility Context
Immigration judges have also rendered adverse credibility determinations based on an alien's return to his country of origin. It is unclear why courts began assessing an alien's return trip to his country of origin in the credibility context rather than in the burden of proof context. For example, in Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit found that it was reasonable for an immigration judge to find an asylum claim "implausible" in the credibility context where the alien continually returned to China, his country of origin.
110
The court explained that the immigration judge properly found the alien incredible because "it was implausible that a person seeking to flee from repression . . . would have repeatedly put himself in situations where he encountered legal authorities checking his identity and, possibly, his illegal status."
111
Despite some of its more nuanced decisions, the Ninth Circuit has also used evidence of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin to uphold adverse credibility determinations. In Loho v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit found that an immigration judge was correct in considering Loho's voluntary 108. 55 F. App'x 609, 615-16 (3d Cir. 2003). Derevianko explained that he was recruited to be an informant for the KGB while a university student in Ukraine, but that he eventually became an enemy of the Ukrainian KGB chief. Id. at 610-11. In the early-1990's, the KGB repeatedly threatened Derevianko in person and by phone, two men attempted to kidnap him, and his father died suspiciously at his home. Id. at 611. In May 1996, Derevianko testified as the primary witness in an inquiry into the KGB chief's corrupt practices. Id. As a consequence, the KGB threatened his life and, in September 1996, fraudulent criminal charges were brought against him. Id. at 611-12. Derevianko subsequently traveled between the United States for short business and personal trips, and Ukraine, to address the charges against him. Id. at 612. Additionally, Derevianko took two trips to the Dominican Republic in January 1998 to renew his immigration status, and he took a four-day trip to Hungary to consult with an attorney about criminal charges against him in Ukraine. Id. Derevianko then filed for asylum in the United States. Id. at 612-13.
109. 538 F.3d 899, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that "three armed men had been coming nightly to the house where [his children] were staying" in Liberia, compelling him to return to bring them to the United States).
110. 509 F.3d 63, 68 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that Yan's testimony about his trips to and from China "raise[d] serious doubts as to whether [he] was ever subjected to persecution").
111. Id. at 68 n.2.
return to her country of origin in evaluating her credibility.
112
Although previous Ninth Circuit decisions had considered an alien's return to his home country only in assessing whether he had met his burden of proof for I-589 relief from removal, the court concluded that the immigration judge's consideration of Loho's voluntary return was appropriate in evaluating her credibility. 113 The court reasoned that, although it had never explicitly held that voluntary return was relevant to credibility, its previous decisions indicated that considering voluntary return in this context would be permissible.
114 This is an incorrect interpretation of Ninth Circuit precedent. Four years before Loho, the Ninth Circuit in Ding v. Ashcroft overturned an immigration judge's adverse credibility finding that relied on the conclusion that the alien "was unable or unwilling to explain why she did not seek refuge in another country nor why she voluntarily returned to the country where she claimed to have been persecuted." 115 This case does not "imply" that a voluntary return may be considered in rendering an adverse credibility determination, as was suggested by the court in Loho.
116
Like the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have approved of an immigration judge's consideration of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin in evaluating his credibility. 117 112. 531 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008). In Loho, the alien explained that she "twice was attacked by assailants uttering racial slurs, that her house was robbed by indigenous Indonesians, and that her workplace and church were damaged during riots aimed at Indonesians of Chinese ancestry." Id. at 1017. She also testified that she travelled to the United States to visit family twice during the period of persecution and harassment, but she did not seek asylum during those trips. Id. She explained to the immigration judge that she failed to apply because she was not familiar with the process and did not have enough time to educate herself. Id. When asked about her trip, Loho explained that she was afraid to return to Indonesia, but did so regardless because she had to work. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the immigration judge's adverse credibility finding, explaining that the evaluation was justified because "after leaving her home country for the safety of the United States, Loho took minimal steps to investigate the availability of some means of avoiding a return to the country she claims to have feared. 
III. IMMIGRATION JUDGES SHOULD NOT USE VOLUNTARY RETURN TRIPS TO SUPPORT AN ADVERSE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION
To remedy the inconsistent treatment of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin, immigration judges should consider an alien's return to his country of origin only in determining whether he has satisfied his burden of proof. Voluntary returns should not be used to support an adverse credibility determination, because it leads to inaccurate, overreaching, and illogical decisions and the denial of due process.
Consistency throughout the judicial process is imperative. Perhaps the most compelling argument for consistency "is the principle of equal treatment-the notion that inconsistent outcomes are substantively unfair."
118 Additionally, immigration judges and circuit courts should strive for consistent adjudication to achieve certainty and predictability in the law, which will enhance stability and efficiency. 119 Finally, a consistent approach is generally acceptable to both the parties and the public, "a central concern of every adjudication process." 120 Kocheleva v. Holder offers an example of a troubling credibility determination based on an alien's voluntary return trip. 121 In Kocheleva, the Ninth Circuit upheld an immigration judge's adverse credibility determination, despite concluding that it "[did] not find substantial evidence to support all of the reasons given by the IJ [immigration judge] for finding Kocheleva not credible."
122 The court upheld the adverse credibility determination based only on Kocheleva's voluntary return to her home country of Russia after traveling to Spain and Greece. 123 Although the immigration judge could have properly considered Kocheleva's voluntary return to Russia in the burden of proof context, the judge inappropriately denied her application on credibility grounds, finding the entirety of her testimony not credible because she traveled abroad twice.
The Second Circuit recognized the faults in utilizing an alien's return trip to evaluate credibility in Kone v. Holder. 124 In Kone, the court reviewed the asylum application of an alien who had travelled between the Ivory Coast and 118. Legomsky, Learning to Live, supra note 63, at 425 (stressing the principle that "[w]hen two people are situated identically in all legally relevant aspects, the law should treat them the same").
119. Id. at 426 (explaining that judicial resources are necessary to remedy inconsistent rulings and to accommodate the resulting increased litigation).
120. Id. at 427 (noting that inconsistent outcomes are commonly perceived to be unfair and impractical).
121 the United States. 125 Kone was subjected to female genital mutilation as a child and, as an adult, was incarcerated because of her political affiliation.
126
Although Kone faced death threats and feared additional punishment for her political ties, she "was optimistic that the political and ethnic strife in the country would resolve."
127 Kone traveled to the United States several times upon her release from prison, but she did not seek asylum.
128 While in the United States on one of these occasions, Kone's political opponents killed her father.
129 Kone returned to the Ivory Coast once more, but she was there for only a few "weeks when the government bombed Dioula towns, killing more than 250 people."
130 Following the bombings, Kone finally decided to flee to the United States permanently to seek asylum. 131 The immigration judge denied Kone's asylum application, finding that, although her claims of genital mutilation were corroborated by expert medical evidence, she was not credible overall because she voluntarily returned to the Ivory Coast. 132 The BIA upheld this adverse credibility determination.
133
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that "return trips alone are insufficient to establish a lack of credibility," noting that "a more nuanced consideration of the circumstances surrounding such returns is required." 134 The court relied on 125 . Id. at 144. 126. Id. Kone testified that, when she was eight years old, two elderly women and her grandmother pushed her to the ground, held her hand, and "cut [her] private parts with a knife," causing pain "so severe that [she] passed out." Id. Kone stated that she continues to suffer physically and emotionally from the procedure. Id. When she was an adult, Kone was arrested for her membership in the RDR political opposition party; government officials arrested several rank-and-file members of the party-including Kone-after finding their RDR membership cards. Id.
127. Id. While Kone was in prison, the guards denied her water, beat her daily, and attempted to rape her. Id. After she was released, "the guards warned [her] that they would catch and kill her if she continued to support the RDR." Id.
128. Id. at 144-45 (noting that Kone traveled to the United States once before her arrest, and traveled between the United States and the Ivory Coast at least four more times before applying for asylum).
129. Id. at 144 ("Kone's father was killed while praying at a mosque in Abidjan that was stormed by armed supporters of the Côte d'Ivoire's president.").
130. Id. at 144-45 (noting that Kone returned to the Ivory Coast several months following her father's murder).
131. Id. at 145. Kone explained that she fled to the United States permanently because of the bombings in Dioula communities and because her daughter, who was born in the United States during one of her trips there, would soon be old enough to undergo genital mutilation. Id. at 144-45.
132. Id. at 145 (finding that "Kone's voluntary return trips to the Côte d'Ivoire rebutted the presumption of future persecution" to which Kone was entitled after providing evidence of past persecution).
133. Id. (noting that the BIA addressed and affirmed the immigration judge's credibility evaluation specifically).
134. Id. at 150-51 (emphasis added) (concluding that the immigration judge made an error of fact by finding that Kone worked for a government agency, which the immigration judge also the Seventh Circuit's decision in Tarraf v. Gonzales, explaining that "[t]here well may be circumstances when a person who legitimately fears persecution nevertheless might elect to return temporarily to his home country." 135 The Tarraf court explained that "health conditions of family members and other major life events might drive a person to choose to take certain risks and return home, while doing his best to mitigate them."
136 Similarly, Kone explained that she had traveled to the United States for the health of her child, and that she had returned to the Ivory Coast in the hope that conditions in the country were improving; however, the immigration judge did not credit her explanations.
137
Under Second Circuit precedent, the immigration judge would not be required to consider such an explanation in the credibility context.
138
The appellate court's reconsideration of Kone's explanation relied on in finding Kone not credible). The Second Circuit has followed its dicta in Kone in subsequent decisions in order to provide more appropriate, detailed findings. See, e.g., Fnu v. Holder, 381 F. App'x 17, 19 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that despite the holding in Kone, the immigration judge properly "considered Fnu's return trip to Indonesia among numerous other findings, including a detailed analysis of country conditions, in denying his asylum application").
135 He also attempted to travel to the United States, but, when he was unable to enter the country, he returned to Lebanon for a year and a half. Id. Upon his return, Hezbollah arrested him and detained him for one month before he managed to escape and flee to the United States via Mexico. Id. Tarraf applied for asylum, explaining that, since arriving in the United States, Hezbollah had confiscated his apartment in Lebanon and killed his twenty-one-year-old nephew. Id. Tarraf stated that Hezbollah continued to look for him, and even questioned his seven-year-old daughter about his whereabouts. Id. The immigration judge found Tarraf incredible, relying, in part, on Tarraf's voluntary return trips to Lebanon following his brother's murder. Id. at 530-31. The Seventh Circuit admonished the immigration judge's finding, explaining that " [a] proposition that any voluntary return to one's home country renders any claim regarding past and future persecution incredible would be far too broad a proposition to serve as a working rule for assessing an alien's testimony," and noting that "each case must be considered in light of its own specific facts." Id. at 534. Ultimately, however, the Seventh Circuit found that the alternate discrepancies in Tarraf's testimony on which the immigration judge relied to render an adverse credibility determination were sufficient to uphold that determination as supported by substantial evidence. Id.
136. Id. at 534. 137. Kone, 596 F.3d at 144, 151 n.9 (noting that the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination was based, "in substantial part," on Kone's return trips to the Ivory Coast).
138. See, e.g., Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (indicating that the Second Circuit had "never required that an IJ, when faced with inconsistent testimony of an asylum applicant, must always bring any apparent inconsistencies to the applicant's attention and actively solicit an explanation").
highlights why it is best for immigration judges to consider an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin in the burden of proof context, and not the credibility context.
Kone also demonstrates the importance of considering the circumstances surrounding an alien's return trip. Kone, who suffered long-term harm, may not have felt a legitimate, subjective fear until her last trip to the Ivory Coast.
139 Thus, it is imperative for courts to provide an alien the opportunity to explain why he has a subjective fear of future persecution. During her final trip, Kone witnessed bombings that targeted her ethnic group, and her family pressured her to subject her daughter to genital mutilation; these circumstances motivated Kone to leave the Ivory Coast and seek protection in the United States.
140 Providing Kone with the opportunity to clarify the circumstances surrounding her return would have improved the court's analysis.
Immigration judges should consider an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin carefully, especially in light of the importance of the right to travel without negative consequences.
141 Even in permitting restrictions on travel, courts have maintained that the right to free travel is part of a basic conception of liberty.
142 Asylum applicants have an especially compelling interest in international travel, which helps "to maintain their familial, associational, and cultural ties." 143 For example, asylum applicants may return 139. See Kone, 596 F.3d at 149 (noting that Kone was persecuted beyond the genital mutilation that she suffered as a child; some of the harm she suffered did not take place until her final trip to the Ivory Coast). Importantly, immigration judges are required to consider the cumulative effect of past harm in assessing whether an asylum application has suffered past persecution. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005 ). This provides insight into how immigration judges should consider an alien's circumstances and explanation for his voluntary return: judges should consider the cumulative effect of the alien's circumstances in determining the alien's subjective fear, as the alien may not have feared additional persecution until he returned to his country of origin and witnessed or experienced an event that triggered his fear. This appears to be true in both De Santamaria and Kone, in which an occurrence during each applicant's final return to her country of origin triggered a subjective fear of future harm and provided the impetus for filing the asylum application. 143. See id. at 223. The DHS recognizes the importance of international travel for asylum applicants by providing such aliens with a means of applying for travel documents while their applications are pending. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f) (2012) (permitting a limited right to travel for to their country of origin-despite any risk of harm-in order to visit a seriously ill family member or to attend a funeral. 144 Returning to a potentially dangerous country to attend a funeral may be especially important because of the alien's religious beliefs. 145 The issue of whether an alien should return to his home country has both personal and legal effects. On the one hand, an alien's return to his country of origin for a funeral, because it is integral to his religious observance, may cause an immigration judge to find that his fear of future harm lacks credibility. 146 On the other hand, failure to return may cause an immigration judge to doubt the sincerity of the alien's religious beliefs. 147 This potential quandary is alleviated if courts consider the circumstances surrounding and the explanations for the alien's return trip in evaluating his objective and subjective fear of future harm, rather than focusing on how the return trip affects the alien's credibility. 148 Although providing an asylum applicant with the opportunity to explain his circumstances is important, an immigration judge is not necessarily required to provide an alien the opportunity to explain an inconsistency under the REAL asylum applicants). Although an applicant may receive advance parole permitting him to travel, one that "returns to the country of claimed persecution shall be presumed to have abandoned his or her application, unless the applicant is able to establish compelling reasons for such return. 144. Morawetz, supra note 141, at 226 (stating that those who decide not to travel for an event, such as a funeral, "may feel deep moral pain at not having made the effort to be with family").
145. See id. (discussing the significant role religious beliefs play in funerals and asserting that such "religious interests find separate protection in international treaties"). In Kalaj v. Gonzales, 185 F. App'x 468, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2006), the Sixth Circuit conducted a thorough analysis of an alien who voluntarily returned to his country of origin for a funeral. Despite permitting the alien's return to Albania by granting him advance parole, the DHS argued that he was ineligible for asylum on account of his voluntary return. Id. at 473. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Kalaj returned for his sister's burial and funeral service. The Second Circuit has noted that determinations based on a voluntary return trip are problematic when the alien is not given an opportunity to explain. See Juncaj v. I.N.S., 158 Fed. App'x 316, 317 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he IJ's reliance on Juncaj's previous departure from Montenegro is questionable, given that Juncaj was given little opportunity to explain these departures at her hearing.").
ID Act. 149 This can lead to troubling decisions. 150 A negative credibility determination may destroy all of an alien's testimony. A single inconsistency may render all testimony incredible, even if the alien proves that portions of his testimony are true. 151 Under the REAL ID Act, any inconsistency, despite its relationship with the heart of the alien's claim, can support an adverse credibility determination. 152 An immigration judge's credibility determination can be overreaching, and it may not be an accurate assessment of the alien's full testimony. As such, adverse credibility determinations should be limited. 153 Where there is instructive case law outlining the procedure for the consideration of an alien's voluntary return trip in the burden of proof context, there is no need to expand the already-problematic case law governing credibility determinations.
voluntary return trips only in the context of whether the alien met his burden of proof that his fear is well founded rather than using the trips as support for an adverse credibility determination.
Although the standards for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT would seem to avoid some of the subjectivity problems of asylum claims, 163 an adverse credibility determination based on a voluntary return trip may also devastate these claims for relief. An adverse credibility determination may destroy an alien's claim for withholding of removal or relief under the CAT because both claims fail if the alien is unable to show the required objective likelihood of persecution or torture. 164 Thus, if the only evidence of a threat to the alien's life or freedom depended upon the alien's testimony, an adverse credibility finding will necessarily preclude success for withholding or CAT relief. 165 Even if the applicant provides independent evidence to establish an objective fear of future harm, an immigration judge may rely on an adverse credibility determination based on the applicant's voluntary return to his country of origin to deny the withholding of removal and CAT claims, without consideration of the applicant's corroborative evidence. 166 This disparity further demonstrates that, given the complex nature of applications for relief and the multiple forms of relief available, immigration judges should not use evidence of an alien's return trip to his country of origin as support for an adverse credibility determination. A finding, however, that the petitioner is not credible as to his subjective fear of persecution will not preclude a grant of withholding if the immigration judge believes some aspect of the petitioner's claim. See id. at 155-57 (remanding for the agency to consider the risk of future persecution where the immigration judge found the alien's claim of past persecution not credible but nonetheless credited his testimony that he was a Christian).
166. See supra Part II.B (explaining that an immigration judge may deny I-589 relief from removal on either credibility grounds or because the applicant failed to meet his burden of proof).
IV. CONCLUSION
Aliens fleeing from persecution in their countries of origin "can't go home again." 167 However, they should be entitled to a proper review of their asylum applications, even after voluntarily returning to their countries of origin. Judicial evaluation of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin is inconsistent, which is both problematic and unnecessary. Immigration judges should analyze an alien's voluntary return trip to his country of origin in the burden of proof context. In doing so, the judge must consider the circumstances and explanations for the alien's return trip to assess whether the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. In assessing whether the alien is entitled to withholding of removal or CAT relief, immigration judges should also consider evidence of an alien's voluntary return to his country of origin to determine whether it is likely that the alien will face future persecution or torture. However, immigration judges should not use an alien's voluntary return trip to his country of origin in support of an adverse credibility determination because such findings lead to confusing, illogical, and inaccurate determinations. When there is already accurate, instructive case law regarding voluntary return trips in the context of an alien's burden of proof, judges should not consider an alien's voluntary return to render an adverse credibility determination.
This practice has only expanded troubling case law. Considering voluntary returns only in the burden of proof context will ensure greater consistency in the adjudication of asylum applications, protect aliens in danger of persecution, and increase confidence in the courts' ability to administer due process.
